

izing compassion. Being committed to morality implies sensitivity to the suffering of others. At this level it is not necessary that the object of our sensitivity (human or nonhuman) understands what is going on. It is sufficient that humans know what they are doing."

We need not "posit" inherent value in nonhumans in order to behave decently and with compassion! And, of course, some who say they are anthropocentric may well behave more in harmony with what supporters of deep ecology acknowledge as their goals, than some of the proclaimed deep ecologists themselves. But I expect Per Ariansen to use the word "compassion" in a very wide sense. Most theories of morality seem to hold that feelings and inclinations are morally irrelevant. If the *will* to obey, fundamental imperative is decisive, an authoritarian sadist may act in morally impeccable ways.

The concluding remarks of this article are worth considering. "In this attempt to probe the intuitions behind the term 'intrinsic value,' we have arrived at a clearly anthropocentric position . . . incompatible with the platform." But have we? The adjective "anthropocentric" has many meanings, and I do not see which one Ariansen has chosen. In this context, this adjective seems to do more harm than good.

Chapter 51

From Skepticism to Dogmatism and Back: Remarks on the History of Deep Ecology

Peder Anker

The word "deep" has created some confusion among deep ecologists and their critics. What does it mean to be "deep" and who is "shallow?" This dispute started when deep ecology moved from one philosophical culture and context to another, and when Næss's thoughts were adapted by Australian and American thinkers. I wish to suggest that the original ecological philosophy of Næss was first of all a critical project of asking deeper questions about modern materialistic society from a skeptical standpoint. When deep ecology evolved in the interaction with the English-speaking community, however, it turned into an often dogmatic philosophy which transformed questions about ecologically sustainable life into principles for living such life. This later version of constructive deep ecology has its own internal structural flaws and problems, some of which I will address in this essay. My main point, however, is to suggest that deep ecology's original core, the skeptical approach to modern industrial society, remains the most complex and the most stimulating contribution to the environmental debate.

Skepticism: A Way of Asking Deeper Questions

Early sources of Næss's ecological thought indicate that the main focus of his writings was to ask deeper questions concerning consumer society and human relations to nature. In 1968 Næss published his book on *Skepticism* which should, perhaps, be given more attention, not only within the deep ecology

movement but in the philosophical community in general. In *Scepticism* Naess rejects the dominant interpretation of Scepticism as a philosophy that questions the possibility of knowledge, and advocates an even more radical Pyrrhonian-skepticism, which holds that a philosopher is doomed to seek truth knowing that truth cannot be found. According to Naess's interpretation of Sextus Empiricus' outline of Pyrrhonian skepticism, there are three possible philosophical positions embodied, respectively, by the Dogmatists who believe that truth can be found and that some truths are found, their opponents, the Academicians, who deny this, and finally the Sceptics who deny both possibilities. In a skeptical perspective, "those who claim that they have found at least one truth [are dogmatists], those who claim that truth cannot be found in any matter [are academicians], and those who neither claim that they have found at least one truth nor claim to know that truth cannot be found, but persist in their seeking [are sceptics]."¹ The skeptical way of life, Naess argues, follows eleven ways of announcing philosophical questions: (1) The skeptic philosopher reports as a chronicler, he does not affirm the truth of what he says, but only reports how things appear to him at the moment of writing. (2) The skeptic speaks, pronounces or "shows forth" and hence leaves his formulations open in a highly noncommittal way. (3) The skeptic will neither affirm nor deny facts of life, he will only accept in words what appears. (4) The skeptic speaks in "skeptical phrases"—and these make up either a subclass or a total class of his own formulations about non-evident things such as arguments. (5) He or she puts forward formulae for didactic purposes among skeptics. (6) The skeptic uses such words as "perhaps," "presumably," "it seems" out of standard context in order to remind the reader that nothing is taken for certain. (7) The skeptic says something indicative of his or her state of mind to show how she/he feels about things. (8) The skeptic is talking loosely in general terms. (9) He or she sends messages that leave the question of philosophical technique and mediation open. (10) The skeptic is saying things instead of "stating" or "asserting" things. Finally, (11) although the skeptic rejects probabilism, he or she has an inclination to believe one proposition rather than another.

The deep ecological scheme of thinking outlined in the classic 1970 article "Deepness of Questions and the Deep Ecology Movement," reveals a Pyrrhonic aspiration.² Naess does not claim to have found a truth, neither does he claim that truth does not exist; instead he is best described as "a seeker on the path." His famous chains of hypotheses and norms, premises and tentative conclusions are all influenced by the Pyrrhonic spirit and should not be taken for a dogmatic outline of philosophical truths.³ This can be further illustrated by "The Apron" diagram, which is conceived in analogy with a hypothetical-deductive system.⁴ This is not a strict logical system, but a general derivation. The numbers (1) through to (4) denote four logical levels, ranging from deeper premises (1) to a philosophical platform (2), via sociological description (3) to political action (4). A closer examination of these levels will reveal the skeptic endeavor:




Figure 51.1. The Apron Diagram.

Level 1: In principle, deep ecology suggests and invites a large number of different ecosophies based on and inspired by different religions and philosophical traditions and systems. Every supporter of the movement is free to formulate his or her own version of an ecosophical understanding, assuming that his/her support for the deep ecology platform remains firm. Naess has designated his own version of ecosophy by the letter T.⁵ Other contributors all recognize this metaethical pluralism. In the apron diagram, this pluralism is represented by the ecosophies A and B. These may be unsystematic fragments or comprehensive philosophical or religious worldviews. Naess's skepticism precludes a philosophical system based on a singular term or proposition. His basic premises do not

start at a particular "point." This is because the deepest norms necessarily have to rest on an (unfounded) assertion, or on two mutually supportive assertions (which suggests a circular argument) or end up in an infinite regression. To avoid these logical problems the top of the diagram is flat. In Ecosophy T, Naess nevertheless proposes a starting "point" in the single norm "Self-realization!"¹ I shall return to it later.

Level 2: The deep ecological movement is held together by shared views with regard to environmental problems. The different ecosophies support one or more of these ideas or a similar set of opinions. The transition from level 1 is not strictly logical, but is justified through a combination of loose formal logic and empirical hypotheses about actual states of affairs. Most deep ecology theorists are less concerned with the logical aspects and adhere to the platform on a more intuitive basis. In a skeptical fashion Naess "formulates, utters, puts forward and reports as a chronicler" what appears as environmental phrases or messages that most deep ecologists can generally support (as articulated by the platform P).⁶ The platform is by no means a manifesto of dogmas a deep ecologist must endorse in order to be a member of the same club. The 8 points should rather be read in a Pyrrhonic spirit, as statements formulated in order to help environmentalists to ask deeper questions about the human relation to the earth and to assert their common goals. Naess stresses that (P) is only one of many possible ways of announcing an environmental position, and that he, as a skeptical philosopher, is only a supporter of deep ecology with the right to test counterpositions. In order to allow pluralism at level 1 and at the same time create consensus within the movement, central concepts at level 2 can be phrased in different ways: e.g., the chief idea that life on earth has "intrinsic value" can be reformulated as "inherent value" or "value in itself." But in spite of the diversity of ecosophies and respective metaphysical or religious positions at level 1, the platform does provide some sort of common ground. The impreciseness of the formulations allows for a high level of "overlapping consensus" about shared ideas in the movement.

Level 3: This level consists of an extensive description of social states of affairs as viewed by environmental interests and represents subsequent concretizations of the principles of the platform in the form of general (and not singular) specific norms of action.⁷ The concretizations will be dependent on social context, i.e., they will take into account differences between societies and their value systems. For example, it has been documented that the population of Louisiana takes a more positive view of oil drilling than the population of California.⁸ A general deep ecological norm of action would tend to be critical of oil drilling (because of pollution, CO₂-releases, etc.). Yet, given differing basic views in the two populations, a deep ecological norm of action might still be more critical of oil development in California than in Louisiana.

Level 4: This level refers to singular decisions made in concrete contexts of action guided by the level 3 descriptions and norms. Practical conclusions about particular issues will differ somewhat due to cultural, local, and philosophical differences (C and D). Conclusions reached at this level may lead to changes at other levels. The consequences of interventions at level 4 may in turn lead to

changes in the norms of action at level 3. Thus interventions in society may ultimately lead to a change in sociological description belonging to level 3, which will in turn affect new norms of action. Practical conclusions may also lead to changes in the platform at level 2 or 1 itself, as the consequences of actions may raise a strong need for revising some ultimate norms or hypotheses.

It is difficult to criticize a skeptical strategy of reasoning. It is impossible to assault Pyrrho's notion of "truth" in view of the fact that Pyrrho neither claims that he has found at least one truth nor claims to know that truth cannot be found. By analogy, it is very hard to criticize Naess's *either-or* way of thinking since he reiterates that he is not a "deep ecologist" but a "supporter of deep ecology," one who persists in seeking ecological insights by asking deep questions. This skeptical strategy of reasoning allows him to hold (P) and (not-P), while searching after (P). The skeptical way of formulating deep ecology makes it, then, an open philosophy. One can argue from a radical (A) or reformist position (B), while holding a strict or modified version of (P), to finally reward deep ecological political action with multiple outcomes (C or D). In a political debate Naess can attack and retreat at the same time, offend and cajole, and finally score on all fronts.

Let us return to level 1 of the Apron in order to see how Naess poses deep questions within a deep ecological framework. Inspiration for Ecosophy T has been drawn from a number of sources, most importantly Benedict de Spinoza and Mahatma Gandhi.⁹ Few readers of Naess's deep ecological writings have noted how Naess uses Pyrrhonism as a key to ask deep questions with regard to self-realization. His reading of Spinoza's holism and notion of God has the hallmarks of a Pyrrhonic search for truth. According to Spinoza, the power with which one struggles for self-preservation is an expression of the power of God in his active aspect,¹⁰ so that those who realize themselves can be said to be living the life of God. Naess links this views with Gandhi's concept of self-realization and the distinction between a "little self" (with a lower case s) and "The Big Self" (with a capital S).¹¹ God (synonymous with Self and Nature) is absolutely infinite and, by necessity, finding expression in all finite beings. Every act of self-expression is constitutive of the particular being's striving for self-actualization. Spinoza takes it to be a necessity, an operation by which God engenders the indispensable self-realization. It is human purpose to participate fully in the realization of the Self. Hence the call for "Self-realization!"¹² that is, for a search of an understanding of the Being from which one's being proceeds: Nature.

It may be argued that religion is Naess's private affair. Still it is interesting to ask what it means that "God is Nature," if "Nature" can be interpreted in multifarious ways. Christian, Hindu, atheist, Jewish, and pagan influences seem to mix and match in Naess. There are reasons to believe, however, that he distances himself from any religious commitment. In skeptical wonder he moves playfully between systems. He shows great curiosity and respect, but seems to have little faith in any of them. With a mixture of pragmatic pietistic rationalism and mysticism, he repeats after Kepler that he is "attracted by the mysticism within mathe-

matics, so to say, where I need not think of God or the divinity of numbers. One should never let the precision of science wear down the wonder within it."¹⁵ "Infinite wonder" is perhaps the most apt description of what Naess understands by religion. Seen in this way, the concept of God becomes a matter of "asking deeper questions" or philosophical wonder about a strictly rationalist system. Similarly Ecosophy T is a skeptic's way of asking deep questions and tentative answers which should not be apprehended as truths but, rather, as possible interpretations of the lifeworld. Naess's skeptical model of Ecosophy T is a personal *Weltanschauung* that can not—and should not—be reduced to dogmatic announcements of truth. It is in the light of these qualifications that one must understand Naess's concept of the "self."

What consequences does all of this have for Naess's view of the individual? Ecosophic self-realization, as presented by Naess, is a recognition of biospheric participation in the Self. Everything is connected in an ecosocial unity; the individual is part of coexistence with Nature, a coexistence that is for the best of all concerned.

[Life and death cooperate.] This presupposes that everything is connected and that "we" are fragments—not parts existing in isolation. . . . In order to be fragments of a greater whole, "we" are engaged in the formation of this unity. Through it, "we" take part in the greatness of the whole. To be a fragment is more than to be a part, in that we experience the whole and can base our lives on this awareness.¹⁴

Individuals realize themselves through identification with the extended Self or Nature. Self-realization is achieved through identification and symbolic coexistence with Nature. The sense of participating in a greater whole is basic to the individual's self-respect and self-esteem. If this greater context is destroyed by catastrophes, "nothing appears to remain [of the self]."¹⁵ This does not, however, imply that self-realization is confined to particular societies. Inadequate self-recognition as an isolated ego independent of the deeper ecosocial unity is a misconceived and "shallow" self-recognition, as opposed to a "deep," adequate understanding of the self within biospheric interdependence.¹⁶ Ecosophy assumes that an increase in recognition of biospheric togetherness is pleasurable while a private ego-realization is tragic and full of sorrows. Which is not to say that private ego-realization is perceived as miserable; the individual in question may well experience happiness, but this happiness is passive and not active. These passive joys are like "the pleasures of slaves under the tyranny of passions."¹⁷

The human species has no right to decrease diversity through a standardization of nature, and any homogenization must be seen as a turn for the worse. Humankind, though unique, is not a privileged species, as all life subsists under the same, shared conditions.¹⁸ The possession of reason, however, does place humans in a position whose singularity must not be underestimated: "Through not belonging in any particular place biologically, we are capable of making

ourselves at home in all. We understand all of the more specialized forms of life."¹⁹ All beings have moral value by virtue of their potential for self-realization, and human "speciesism" is thus reprehensible. An inadequate ego-realization implies a complete indifference to the potential for self-realization of other beings. The ethical goal is the achievement of identification and sympathy with other living beings, as the resultant symbiosis puts the emphasis on an interdependence for the common good.

Because the skeptical way of thinking refers also to ethics,²⁰ it poses problems when it comes to mobilizing an environmental movement. Naess admits as much, remarking that:

I'm sorry to say, in some ways I feel miserable to be defending skepticism now [1974], because there is a very tragic conflict between the attitude I hold in my integrated and concentrated moments, which is more or less skeptical, and the requirement of consistent action. For instance, when we believe that we really must do something about some terrible pressing problem, we must somehow narrow down our perspective. The vast plurality of possible worlds—and how do we know in which world we live—are suddenly not only irrelevant, but contemplation of them undermines the willingness and capacity to act. Most people are only willing to act forcefully and consistently when they have a belief in the truth and close their minds to all else. The students say that we must get rid of particular textbooks of Naess because they undermine collective action now and over the next five years. And this is real; it is a tragedy, because they need rhetoric and dogmatism, I think. Skepticism breeds passivity. I do not feel that way, but the students do.²¹

There is a clear implication here that Naess's politically active students are unhappy with the skeptical approach because it "breeds passivity." In order to muster environmentalists, the students suggest that a philosopher needs to "narrow down our perspective" to a "belief in the truth" and to a rhetoric that can mobilize a collective action. Naess is prepared to persist in his skepticism though his confession explains some of his tolerance for the dogmatic adaptation of deep ecology in the English-speaking community.

Dogmatism: The Australian-American Adaptation of Deep Ecology

Due to a failure to understand Naess's skeptical way of tackling philosophical questions, many Australian and American philosophers within (and outside) the deep ecology movement have understood the ecosophy of "Self-realization!" in dogmatic terms. What started off in Norway as a way of problematizing environmental crisis, was understood as the way of responding to environmental problems.²² When deep ecology moved from Norway to Australia and America, it moved from skepticism to a more rigid—and clear—position. Naess was attributed with the ability to derive truth from fundamentals. Two cases in point

are the Australian philosopher Warwick Fox and the American philosopher Thomas Berry.

The assessment of Nass's thoughts by Fox illustrates a failure to understand Nass's way of asking deep skeptical questions about environmental problems. According to Nass, those who claim that they have found at least one truth are dogmatists. This is precisely how Nass is described in Fox's book *Towards a Transpersonal Ecology*. The principal question in Fox's book is: "Can it . . . be shown that asking deeper questions or deriving policies from fundamentals will always lead to ecocentric answers and policies?"²³ Nass's skeptical notion of "asking deeper questions" is here synonymous with the dogmatic thought of "deriving policies from fundamentals." What started in Bucharest in the early 1970s as a philosophy asking critical questions on environmental issues, has later turned into building constructive philosophy or moral paradigms based on the true ecological *Weltanschauung*. Fox ultimately treats Nass as if he had seen "the light" and knew all the answers with regard to how to live an ecologically responsible life. Deep ecology has become synonymous with the contemporary construction of ecotopias.

George Sessions's latest anthology on deep ecology is also instructive in this regard. A prototypical example is to be found in Thomas Berry's article "The Viable Human." Berry states that "The ecologist is offering a way of moving toward a new expression of the true wonderworld of nature as the context for a viable human situation."²⁴ He argues that ecology offers "expressions of the truth," which is exactly what Nass, in his work in favor of skepticism, tries to avoid. Furthermore, Berry writes about the "wonderworld of nature," as if the harmony in nature was the fact of nature. In the same article Berry writes about the universe in terms of "the Great Mother,"²⁵ and thus repeats the old stoic doxa of a natural, good greater union of things. The structural problems of Berry's romance with the earth is that a humanization of nature through elevating analogies and symbols demands censorship of the dark aspects of nature and of the human condition. Why not a symbol of the harsh stepmother,²⁶ unfolding her secret wisdom through radon gas or earthquakes in California? Humanization of nature in terms of "a Great Mother" or "a harsh stepmother" is, of course, part of an anthropocentric act of reading human ideas and values into nature. Anthropocentrism refuses to go away.

Skeptic Optimism and the Problem of Evil

In accordance with his skeptical way of thinking, Nass is critical of the current nominalistic legitimization of ethics. In his exchange with Genevieve Lloyd on Spinoza, he argues against a shift towards moralizing in order to find a satisfactory metaphysics of environmentalism. Consistently with his ontological Spinozism, Nass suggests that the only valid ethics should rely on intuitions.²⁷ One such "intuition" is an optimism and rationality with regard to nature and human possibilities: Nature is essentially good and Nass hopes that sometime in the future humanity will finally reconcile itself with the environment.

This poses problems. Despite his skepticism Nass seems to be of the opinion that all is for the best in the ecological world, and thus shares the optimistic view of humbler animals in the old Aristotelian tradition.²⁸ Even the most displeasing parts of nature have a hidden beauty:

Even exquisitely "ugly" animals such as the Tasmanian devil . . . which seems to be unflinchingly aggressive toward humans and completely devoid of gratitude for whatever we do to satisfy its hunger and needs, elicit sympathy and respect not only when considered *sub specie aeternitatis*, as a natural wonder, part of the richness and diversity of life on this planet, but also as a symbol of our own aggressiveness and lack of gratitude. The Tasmanian devil permits us to laugh at ourselves.²⁹

The Tasmanian devil has a value in itself and contributes to the richness, flourishing, and diversity of life. Furthermore, identification with the Tasmanian devil can be instructive on our way towards ecological self-realization: the devil is a mirror of our own stupid aggressiveness. Deep ecologists, we presume, require identification with all the other "ugly" parts of the household of nature: Species that act in a way that most humans find infinitely cruel, such as a snake slowly eating a living mouse, nature disasters that can be harmful to nature itself (thunderstorms, floods, or earthquakes), drastic changes in climatic conditions that create problems for human and animal welfare, and natural diseases, such as cancer, most humans could do without. All of these belong to the ecosystem with which we ideally should identify. The feeling of sympathy for other species suggests norms for moral and political action with regard to the environment. Evil is just a necessary shadow in an altogether harmonious nature. Since harmful nature is also part of the future sustainable society, the attitude of acquiescence vis-à-vis such nature is the only sensible strategy. It does not make sense to respond in punitive terms to demonstrate resistance against "natural" evil.

The inability to confront and deal with evil is especially conspicuous when it comes to disentangling evil from the human realm. Passivity vis-à-vis evil may lead to the extension of evil. Deep ecologists' support of green political ecology, that is politics inspired by ecological insights, entails a danger of conserving evil, whether metaphysical, physical, or moral. An example is to be found in Nass's article "Deep Ecology for the Twenty-Second Century."³⁰ Here Nass explains that he is "a convinced optimist when it comes to the twenty-second century," but first we will have to go through the catharsis of the twenty-first. Depending on what we do today, Nass sketches four scenarios for deep ecology of the twenty-first century:

1. "ecologically strict policies, perhaps through undemocratic, and even brutal dictatorial military means";
2. breakdown and total chaos with harsh measures to fight it;
3. catastrophic events with "a turn towards sustainability, but only after enormous ecological devastation,"

4. Ecological enlightenment, with "drastic reduction in the quality of life" (no political regime is indicated, but let us assume that this scenario is democratic).

Næss's hope is, of course, the last enlightenment scenario. Even if it is unclear what a green heaven of the twenty-second century will look like, to some it may be all too clear that deep ecology of the twenty-first century will be a walk through hell. Næss's "optimism" is of a Ragnarök kind: envisioning one hundred evil years facing humanity before a new mankind is reborn. The argument that evil in the twenty-first century is necessary for the sake of tomorrow's bliss reveals structural similarities with the eighteenth century optimism. Political use of force and violence is necessary in order to reach a higher goal in the future.

What sorts of ideas underpin deep ecological construction of the ecologically sustainable society? First, the basis for sustainable politics is, according to Næss, ecological sustainability: "Long-range, local, district, regional, national, and global wide ecological sustainability is the criterion of ecologically responsible policies as a whole."³¹ Næss is silent on the question of whether, in order to cope with the crisis, we will have to morally submit to ecological laws. It is doubtful whether mere intuition and ecological empathy, sometimes advocated by Næss as a moral basis for conflict-resolution in the "ideals of a Green society,"³² will be a sufficient warrant against crimes and misdemeanors. The Næss-inspired deep ecologist, T. O'Riordan, argues that "Ecological (and other natural) laws dictate human morality."³³ If that is the case, there is not much room for autonomy (or self-determination). It is legitimate to suggest that those few who know such laws will guide politics. The differentiating factor will be the degree of ecological knowledge: deep, shallow, or none. The membership of such an ecological community should be less the matter of personal choice than of the dictates of the natural order.

Such perception of the ecological society, however qualified, is dangerously close to Hannah Arendt's notion of radical evil. Arendt denigrates any politics that takes its concerns from the household, whether the human household or the household of nature. Ecological politics seem to do precisely that. The notion of evil refers to conditions of necessity in households that "transcend the realm of human affairs and the potentialities of human power." In such conditions "men are unable to forgive what they cannot punish and that they are unable to punish what has turned out to be unforgivable."³⁴ Neither ecological science nor deep ecology specify any basis for a morally inferred punitive action when natural evil breaks out.

The situation reveals a Job scenario discussed by Næss's famous student Peter Wessel Zapffe.³⁵ Job, for no clear reason, was deprived of his family, his farm and his health by God's omnipotence, covenant, and order. After Job's appeals for justice, God revealed himself in the shape of animal monsters and ordered Job to submit to his almighty will. The optimistic dogmatic ecosopher would have to join God (or Nature) in this and preach along the same conservative paternalistic line: "Be quiet, Job! Who do you think you are in the 'web of life'? You must remember Self-realization (with capital S) and submit to the laws of ecology!"

To conclude. There are good reasons to mistrust totalizing visions put forward by some deep ecologists, and instead be more aware of the complexity and contradictions of the social organism. Therefore, in revaluing deep ecology it is worth rethinking the forgotten critical potential of this philosophy. Using the "skeptical deep ecology" against dogmatic "truths" current in ecological literature would reorient the environmental debate back to its primary track: the critique of progressive industrialism. Such a reorientation, however, would have to address the question of evil which keeps haunting nonanthropocentric ethics.

Notes

This chapter is reprinted with minor revisions from *Rethinking Deep Ecology*. Nature and Humanities Series, ed., Nina Witoszek (Oslo: Oslo University, Center for Development and the Environment, 1996). I am grateful to Nina Witoszek for her comments.

¹ Arne Næss, *Scepticism* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1968), 4, 7–12. See also Arne Næss, *A Sceptical Dialogue on Induction* (Assen, The Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1984). Nicholas Rescher, *Scepticism: A Critical Reappraisal* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980).

² Arne Næss, "Deepness of Questions and the Deep Ecology Movement" (1970, revised in 1990), published in George Sessions (ed.), *Deep Ecology for the 21st Century* (Boston: Shambhala, 1995), 204–212.

³ Arne Næss, "Finnes det objektive normer?" (Do objective norms exist?) in *Norsk Pedagogisk Arkiv*, Oslo 1946–7, 7; Arne Næss, *Interpretation and Preciseness* (Oslo: Dybwad, 1953), chap. III and VII.

⁴ Arne Næss, "Deep Ecology and Ultimate Premises," in *The Ecologist*, Vol. 18 Nos. 4/5 (1988): 131. Bill Devall and George Sessions, *Deep Ecology* (Salt Lake City: Gibbs M. Smith Inc., 1985), 226. An early version of the diagram is given in Arne Næss, "A Systematization of Gandhian Ethics of Conflict Resolution," *Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 2 no. 2 (1958): 141.

⁵ T—as in the initial of Næss's "Tvergastein" cabin, located in the Norwegian mountains. The esoteric reference to Tvergastein illustrates the concrete ecological "rootedness" of Næss's ecosophic work in his own life. T can also be understood as short for *Tollving*—the Norwegian word for "interpretation," perhaps a cryptic reference to Næss's main work *Interpretation and Preciseness* (1953).

⁶ See this volume, Chapter 20.

⁷ Arne Næss, *Økologi, samfunn og livsstil* (Ecology, Society and Lifestyle), 5th edition (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1976). (New identical edition 1992), 186.

⁸ William R. Freudenberg and Robert Gramling, *Oil in Troubled Waters: Perceptions, Politics and the Battle over Offshore Drilling* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994).

⁹ On Gandhi, see Arne Næss, "A Systematization of Gandhian Ethics of Conflict Resolution," in *Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 2 no. 2 (1958). Arne Næss: *Gandhi og atomalderen* (Gandhi and the Atomic Age), (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1960), 28f. Johan Galtung and Arne Næss, *Gandhis politiske etikk* (Gandhi's political ethics), (Oslo: Tannum, 1955), (3rd edition, Pax Forlag, Oslo 1994), chap. 3. For reasons of space, I shall place less emphasis on Gandhi. None of which is to say that ecosophy is to be seen merely as

an interpretation of these sources—on the contrary, it is an independent philosophical system.¹⁰

¹⁰ Benedict de Spinoza, *Ethics* E3P6Dem; E2P3Sch.

¹¹ Næss, *Økologi*, 1989, 84f.

¹² Næss, *Økologi*, 1976, 312; 1989, 197. As far as I can see, first formulated in Næss, *Conflict*, 1958, 142.

¹³ David Rothenberg, *Arne Næss; Is it Painful to Think?* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 73.

¹⁴ Næss, *Økologi*, 1976, 276–277. My trans. *Ecology*, 1989, 173–4. The word “fragment” indicates a part that is torn loose, that is, torn apart from a greater whole. As can be seen, Næss uses “fragment” in an unusual (and possibly misleading), sense: We are fragments (and not torn-off parts) of a whole. One possible interpretation of Næss’s use of “fragment” is that the recognition of being part of a whole is a limited, that is, a fragmented, recognition of the infinite attributes of nature. Spinoza compares human “fragmented” understanding with that of a bloodworm living in its own blood-universe analogous to humans living with a fragmented perception of the whole. (Letter XV (XXXII) to Oldenburg). Yet such an interpretation of Ecosophy T may imply a problematic concept of the intrinsic value of living beings, so that it is the human anthropocentric, fragmented understanding of nature that implies the value of living things.

¹⁵ Næss, *Økologi*, 1976, 320; *Ecology*, 1989, 173f.

¹⁶ The term “shallow” is in inverted commas to show that it refers to the lack of deep questioning of the environmental crisis and not to “shallow people.” It is this “shallow” anthropocentrism that Næss wishes to change. He does not say that the “shallow” ones cannot be “deep” when it comes to other issues. The term “shallow” seems to imply, and has in fact been taken to imply, that those outside the environmental movement are “one-sided” and “narrow-minded” in all areas. Though this view cannot legitimately be attributed to Næss, it is encoded in his use of words.

¹⁷ Spinoza, E4P66Sch, E5P42Sch; the proposition follows from putting the two references together. Næss, *Ecology*, 1989, 85.

¹⁸ Arne Næss, *Økologi og filosofi* (Ecology and Philosophy), (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1972), 146; 1976, 271f, 296.

¹⁹ Næss, *Økologi*, 1976, 266. See also page 271, note 4, 333. For purposes of later discussion, it is important to note that Næss distances himself from the pessimism of Peter Wessel Zapffe. Zapffe’s opinion appears to be that man has no place in the biosphere; ontologically, we are tragic beings. We should apparently cease to exist voluntarily, before inevitable disaster befalls us. On Zapffe, see Peter Reed and David Rothenberg, *Wisdom in the Open Air* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), chap. 2.

²⁰ Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Ethicists* (Cambridge: Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, 1936).

²¹ Næss in debate with A. J. Ayer, in Fons Elders, ed., *Reflexive Water: The Basic Concerns of Mankind* (London: Souvenir Press, 1974), 26.

²² See Harold Glasser, “Deep Ecology Clarified: A Few Fallacies and Misconceptions,” *The Trumpeter Journal of Ecosophy* 12 (1995): 138–142.

²³ Warwick Fox, *Toward a Transpersonal Ecology* (Boston: Shambhala, 1990), 132, 93f. It appears that Fox has overlooked Næss’s book on skepticism in notes 3f, p. 333f.

²⁴ Thomas Berry, “The Viable Human,” in George Sessions, ed., *Deep Ecology for the 21st Century* (Boston: Shambhala, 1995), 11.

²⁵ Berry, “The Viable Human,” 17.

²⁶ Following Pliny, who writes that “Nature appears to have created all other things [for man’s sake]—though she asks a cruel price for all her generous gifts, making it hardly possible to judge whether she has been more a kind parent to man or more a harsh stepmother.” Pliny, *Natural History* (Cambridge: Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, 1942), Vol. II, Book VII, 507.

²⁷ Genevieve Lloyd, “Spinoza’s Environmental Ethics,” *Inquiry* 3 (1980): 293–311. Arne Næss, “Environmental Ethics and Spinoza’s Ethics. Comments on Genevieve Lloyd’s Article,” *Inquiry* 23 (1980): 313–25. Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Ethicists*, 1936. George Sessions, “The Deep Ecology Movement: A Review,” *Environmental Review* (Summer 1987), 117.

²⁸ Aristotle, *Parts of Animals*, 645a17–23.

²⁹ Arne Næss and Ivar Mysterud, “Philosophy of Wolf Policies: General Principles and Preliminary Exploration of Selected Norms,” *Conservation Biology* 1 (1987): 23.

³⁰ Arne Næss, “Deep Ecology for the Twenty-Second Century,” in Sessions, ed., *Deep Ecology*, 1995.

³¹ Arne Næss, “Politics & the Ecological Crisis,” in Sessions, ed., *Deep Ecology*, 1995, 447. (Næss’s italics.)

³² Arne Næss, “Politics & the Ecological Crisis,” in Sessions, ed., *Deep Ecology*, 1995, 447. Næss, *Ecology*, 1989, 159.

³³ T. O’Riordan is quoted in David Rothenberg’s introduction to Næss, *Ecology*, 1989, 15–17. Rothenberg refers to T. O’Riordan *Environmentalism* (London: Pion, 1981), 376.

³⁴ Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), 241.

³⁵ *The Bible*, Book of Job. See P. W. Zapffe, *Om det tragiske [On the Tragic]*, 1941] (Oslo: Aventura, 1988), chap. 10, part 106, 478f.